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I. INTRODUCTION
Every civil rights movement in the United States must struggle with
how to allocate scarce resources to accomplish the broadest change
possible.  Most legal scholars and many non-lawyer activists have as-
sumed that the law is the most powerful tool in this fight, and that the
higher the level of institution and the more fundamental the law, the
quicker and more effective that change will be.  Thus, many lawyers
and activists have concentrated the efforts of their movements on fed-
eral constitutional protections, the United States Supreme Court, na-
tional legislation, the federal courts, and then state level institutions,
in descending order.
Notwithstanding this faith in the power of law, history suggests
there are problems with this approach.  Despite many legal victories
at very high levels, change has been quite slow for the groups with
these movements.  Disillusioned at the lack of progress given the du-
ration of  struggle, some legal scholars and activists have looked for an
explanation of the slow pace of change in legal terms—assuming that
law could accomplish the change sought quickly and effectively—but
failed because of defects in the law or the legal institution.  Few have
questioned the power of the law in the first place.
The purpose of this article is to explore why law, regardless of its
form as common or positive law and regardless of its mode of opera-
tion, is a poor tool to create social change.  In fact, the power of law
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thanks foremost to John O’Connell for his support and willingness to engage in end-
less discussions on this topic.  This paper was first presented at the Gloucester 2006
conference, “Too Pure an Air”: Law and the Quest for Freedom, Justice, and Equality
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presents something of a paradox.  The greater the power of the legal
structure used, the less likely the result will produce change.
The primary reason for this paradox is a mismatch between the
source of the problem and its solution.  If the source of the social
problem that created a rights movement was the law, then changing
the law would solve the social problem.  However, the source of the
social problem is not the law, but instead is cultural belief.  The law is
often a tool to enforce that cultural belief.  For example, where the
law limits civil and political rights to certain groups, the law is just
that: a tool that serves the belief. In fact, the law reflects those cultural
beliefs.
For example, slavery in this country was made possible by the
power of law that allowed and protected it in a number of ways.  How-
ever, Black people, and not White people, were kept as slaves in this
country because White people believed that Black people were differ-
ent in ways that mattered.  In other words, racial oppression existed in
this country because the culture accepted racism as a cultural value.
One modality of racist oppression in this country was slavery, but slav-
ery was not the cause of that racism.1
For law to be an effective tool of change, then, law must remove the
source of the problem.  But the law simply cannot get at that source
directly.  A change in law does not immediately change beliefs,2 and
so a change in law cannot immediately right a social wrong.  Going
back to the analogy of the mirror, law is a reflection of cultural values,
and changing that reflection does not alter the object being reflected.
Thus, although they seem quite powerful, high-level legal structures
are constrained by the dominant culture.  Without cultural change,
1. Certainly, the practice of race-based slavery would have perpetuated the cul-
tural belief in White supremacy in a number of ways.  The physical bondage and pun-
ishment of slaves in the context of White masters or slave dealers would have
portrayed an image of the physical power of those masters and the lack of power of
the Black slaves to anyone who saw or heard about it.  The actions taken by masters
to control their slaves would also have reinforced that feeling of power and superior-
ity for those masters.  The separate language of newly imported slaves, and their phys-
ical condition after enduring their torturous journey, would have also reinforced the
view that these people were uneducated, uneducable, and savage by nature.  Even
after importation of new slaves was prohibited, all of the ways in which slaves could
be controlled and treated differently from even the poorest Whites reinforced the
notion of inherent difference and inferiority of the Black race.
2. An important caveat needs to be placed here.  The law is a very powerful tool
because we give it more power over us than other forms of knowledge and experi-
ence. See CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 10–11 (1989). Thus, the
law has power to make people change their behavior, and to some extent it operates
to shape beliefs. See id. at 11.  However, where a legal expression clashes with other
core values, people may resist the power of law and reject or subtly change it to fit
with their other values. See id. at 24–25.  This process is discussed in greater detail in
part V.  Theoretically, a culture or a legal system could operate differently to force
change despite people’s beliefs. See e.g., RAY BRADBURY, FAHRENHEIT 451 (Random
House 1991); GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).  That is certainly
not a system that we would knowingly adopt in this country.
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lawmaking through courts is not effective and can perpetuate oppres-
sion instead.  Legislation can be more effective because it is more
likely to embody the beliefs of a cultural majority, but it is subject to
similar limits of culture in its enactment and interpretation.  Paradoxi-
cally, the broader the subject of legislation and the higher the jurisdic-
tion enacting the legislation, the less effective it will be.  Because of
these paradoxes of power, the temptation to focus on the most power-
ful institution, which can offer the staunchest protection and the
broadest sweep in the United States—the Supreme Court and the
Constitution—often wins out but may be the least effective means of
making change.  This paper explores why.
This paper will compare the history of two of the three major civil
rights movements in the United States, comparing the victories and
defeats, and their results.  The movement for Black civil rights and for
women’s rights followed essentially the same pattern and used similar
strategies.  The gay and lesbian civil rights movement, on the other
hand, followed some of the same strategies but has differed in signifi-
cant ways.3  Where each movement has attained success and where
each has failed demonstrates the limits of American legal structures to
effectuate social change.
II. THE GOAL OF RIGHTS MOVEMENTS: EQUALITY
Civil rights movements in the United States are forms of social
movements: one way to use collective efforts to make some kind of a
change in society.4  Some social movements focus on changing individ-
uals, while others focus on changing the social structure or social
conditions.5  Rights movements, by definition, are those social move-
ments which seek to change the social structure or social conditions
through the mechanism of the legal system by establishing a legally
enforceable right.
The change that social movements seek to make is generally de-
scribed by the term “equality.”6  However, it is impossible to make
conclusions about the ability of law to achieve equality without defin-
ing first what equality means.  There are two types of equality.  The
first type is sometimes called formal equality, and sometimes equality
3. Due to space limitations, development of the differences between the Black
and women’s rights movement on the one hand and the gay and lesbian rights move-
ment on the other must wait for future work.  I have tried to note some differences
where I can. See infra notes 18, 76.
4. See Robert H. Lauer, Introduction to SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE, at xi, xiii (Robert H. Lauer ed., 1976).
5. See Robert H. Lauer, Ideology and Strategies of Change: The Case of Ameri-
can Libertarians, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 4, at 92.
6. The goal could also be framed in terms of liberty or freedom.  This paper fo-
cuses on equality because it encompasses liberty as well as freedom. The drive for
liberty or freedom seems to be an attempt to share equally in the freedom and liberty
of the privileged.
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of rights or equal opportunity.  In terms of the law, this refers either to
the absence of classification or a mandate not to classify.  The second
form of equality is substantive equality or equality of results.  It gener-
ally refers to equality in the distribution of goods, resources, and
power.
In different societies at different points in history, governments
have played a number of roles in the quest for equality.  The Ameri-
can colonists were greatly influenced by the political philosophy of
Locke, drawing principles from “natural law” and Aristotelian views
of equality.  Locke posited a law of nature that stood above human
convention and that could be discerned through reason.7  All people
were equal in the sense that they possessed the same natural rights,
and any inequality had to be justifiable, based on morally acceptable
difference.8  Locke also developed the notion that fundamental to
human identity were privileges that other individuals and the govern-
ment ought not impair, which he styled “rights.”9  Chief among these
rights were the right to continue to live, the right to own personal
property, and the right to act in ways that maximized life and property
as long as the exercise of these rights did not interfere with others’
rights to enjoy their lives and property.10  The role of government,
then, was to not frustrate the process of maximizing enjoyment of
these rights.  Translated into the American context, the correct social
ordering would automatically follow if people were allowed to de-
velop their abilities to the extent that nature would allow.11
Behind this theory of government is a view of equality first pro-
posed by Aristotle.  Aristotle argued that true equality required things
(or people) that were the same to be treated alike, and things that
were different to be treated differently.12  Treating “sames” differently
and “differents” alike resulted in inequality.  This notion of equality,
by itself, seems unproblematic.  However, in practice, everything
hinges on how sameness and difference are defined.  For Aristotle, for
example, women were different from men in the way that intellect
7. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 12 (Basil
Blackwell 1946); D.A. LLOYD THOMAS, LOCKE ON GOVERNMENT 16–17 (1995).
8. See LOCKE, supra note 7, at § 4.
9. See id. at §§ 6–7.
10. See id. at §§ 6–7, 25–51.
11. See Thomas Jefferson’s First Inaugural Address, (Mar. 4, 1801), http://
www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/inaug/jefinau1.htm (“[A] wise and frugal Gov-
ernment which shall restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them other-
wise free to regulate their own . . . improvement . . . .”).
12. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 145, 153, 265–67
(trans. F. H. Peters, 15th ed. 1904) (those who are equal should receive equal shares
and those not equal should not).   For United States cases adopting this framework,
see for example, Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 30–32 (1885).
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differs from desire.13  Thus, equality not only tolerated different treat-
ment of women, it required that different treatment.
These theories were played out in the formation of the United
States.  The colonists created a government designed to promote free-
dom and equality for its male citizens, who perceived the greatest
threat of oppression to come from governmental interference in indi-
viduals’ lives.  And so, the powers of the federal government were
quite limited, and the government was structured to diffuse power and
frustrate its exercise, all with a view that the lack of interference
would allow individuals the greatest amount of freedom to realize
their natural potential.  Thus, the government’s role in the citizens’
lives was limited in order to allow each to develop to his natural po-
tential.  If some substantive inequality resulted, that inequality either
was not a problem because it was created by nature and therefore
legitimate and even right, or it was not a problem that government
was properly concerned with.  Thus, the colonists viewed the ideal so-
ciety as one of formal equality.
However, at the same time the government was designed to pro-
mote the rights of citizens, it was also created to enforce oppression.
The Constitution legitimized slavery by setting the number of repre-
sentatives based on the number of free people and three-fifths of the
number of “other [p]ersons.”14  And it further supported the institu-
tion by providing that
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but
shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or
Labour may be due.15
And although it implicitly gave Congress the power to ban the inter-
national slave trade, it provided that Congress would not be able to do
so before 1808 and further that the federal government could impose
a tax on slaves imported.16  It was not until the Thirteenth Amend-
ment was added to the Constitution nearly one hundred years later
that it stopped enforcing this oppression.17
13. See Elizabeth V. Spelman, Who’s Who in the Polis, in ENGENDERING ORIGINS:
CRITICAL FEMINIST READINGS IN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 99, 100–02 (Bat-Ami Bar
On, ed., 1994); ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 265–66.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
15. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
16. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
17. Id. amend. XIII, § 1.  Michael Vorenberg suggests that slavery could have been
abolished without amending the Constitution, but that Americans at the time chose
that path in order to break with the past, and out of a recognition that the Constitu-
tion as written was flawed. MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THE CIVIL
WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 7 (2001).
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE BLACK RIGHTS MOVEMENT: THE
MODEL MOVEMENT
Many scholars have written excellent histories of the Black rights
movement and the women’s movement.18  It is not possible here to
detail those histories in anything approaching that richness, and this
summary will reflect more unity in the movements than actually ex-
isted because of that.  However, the broad outlines of that history tell
us important things about the power of law.
This country was arguably founded as an exercise by a rights move-
ment, which institutionalized individual rights as a founding principle.
Rather than focus on that first movement, I want to focus on what is
probably more universally regarded as a rights movement: the move-
ment for Black rights.
The Black rights movement grew out of the antislavery movement,
but the two were not necessarily synonymous.  Many of those against
the slave trade were not against slavery, and many against slavery be-
lieved that Black people were inherently inferior to Whites.19  There
was also, however, a small group that viewed Black people as equal,
and who fought slavery, not just the slave trade, on that ground.20
From the beginning of the movement in the colonies and then the
United States, the movement focused on structures of the law: the
federal Constitution, state constitutions, and legislation, rather than
on grassroots solutions.21  When those proved ineffective, the move-
ment moved back to the people, but at least some of these grassroots
efforts were largely subverted by proslavery forces, and the movement
18. The history of the gay and lesbian rights movement contrasts with these, but
space limitations prevent its inclusion.  For good resources, see BARRY D. ADAM,
THE RISE OF A GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT (1987); JOHN D’EMILIO, MAKING
TROUBLE: ESSAYS ON GAY HISTORY, POLITICS, AND THE UNIVERSITY (1992); JOHN
D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES (1983); MARTIN DUBERMAN,
STONEWALL (1993); LILLIAN FADERMAN, ODD GIRLS AND TWILIGHT LOVERS: A HIS-
TORY OF LESBIAN LIFE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1991); JONATHON KATZ,
GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE U.S.A. (Harper Colo-
phon 1985); ERIC MARCUS, MAKING HISTORY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GAY AND LES-
BIAN CIVIL RIGHTS 1945–1990 (1992).  For a great documentary on the subject, see
OUT OF THE PAST—THE STRUGGLE FOR GAY AND LESBIAN RIGHTS IN AMERICA
(Allumination 1998).
19. See ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, WITHOUT CONSENT OR CONTRACT: THE RISE
AND FALL OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 202–03, 241–43 (1989).
20. See id. at 204, 211, 251 (describing a group of Germantown Quakers who ad-
vocated an end to slavery based on the Golden Rule and the growth of that perspec-
tive among Quakers).  The early abolitionist movement in Britain was extremely
grassroots, focused on churches and local governments.  Within 25 years, it was able
to win a parliamentary victory to end the international slave trade, and within 50
years, it was able to emancipate all slaves in the British colonies and the West Indies.
Id. at 208; see also id. at 211–12.  This was a great success in a relatively short period
of time.
21. See id. at 244–47.
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withered.22  However, with the rise of the religious-revival movement
in the early nineteenth century, abolition gained ground.23  The aboli-
tionists focused their efforts on the members of their religious denom-
inations, and although some efforts were aimed at legal solutions,
most efforts focused on the power of the church to coerce change or
to encourage people to voluntarily emancipate their slaves.24  Leaders
within the movement consciously chose not to pursue legal remedies,
believing that the structure of the federal Constitution made this im-
possible.25  Popular resistance to the abolitionist movement and vio-
lence against its participants attracted many powerful people to the
movement.26  Disillusionment with backlash and the lack of change
caused some influential abolitionists to campaign to end discrimina-
tion against Blacks and against women.27  They widely published a
tract, culled from over 20,000 southern newspapers, describing the
horrifying practices of average slave owners and the legal system that
supported slavery, while portraying those practices as a natural out-
growth of power over another.28
As more time passed without the southern slave owners voluntarily
ending the practice, abolitionists turned to federal legal solutions and
helped form a new political party, the Republicans.29  At the same
time, federal legal institutions were used to enforce the institution of
slavery including the fugitive slave laws, which were various laws that
allowed the expansion of slavery into new territories, and the Su-
preme Court’s Dred Scott decision.30  The Republican Party gained
the presidency in 1860, radicalizing northern voters on the antislavery
position along the way.31
During the Civil War, the abolitionists shifted their strategy to the
legal sphere, speaking before Congress and the President, and press-
22. See id. at 250–54 (describing the various grassroots efforts, particularly the col-
onization movement that antislavery advocates believed would undermine slavery in
the South, but which actually reinforced the racism that supported slavery by remov-
ing free Blacks from any contact with enslaved Blacks).
23. See id. at 254, 264–69.
24. See id. at 269–76, 322–29.
25. See id. at 281–82.
26. See id. at 272–74.
27. See id. at 276–77.
28. See id. at 278.  This tract was researched and written by Theodore Weld and his
wife and sister-in-law, Angeline and Sarah Grimke´, and is considered the most influ-
ential antebellum antislavery tract. Id.
29. See id. at 329–38, 345–47, 376–78.
30. See id. at 341–42.  In Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), the Supreme Court
held that no Black person (free or enslaved) was a citizen of the United States and
that the Missouri Compromise unconstitutionally deprived slave owners of their
rights to property without due process of law, further suggesting that states could not
ban slavery under the federal Constitution. See FOGEL, supra note 19, at 343 (citing
Abraham Lincoln, Speech at the Republican State Convention (June 16, 1858)
(known as the House Divided Speech)).
31. FOGEL, supra note 19, at 382–83.
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ing emancipation legislation.32  The progress of the War convinced
Lincoln that he had to emancipate the slaves in the rebellious states to
save the Union, and so he issued the Emancipation Proclamation.33
Congress supported this move and required the abolition of slavery as
a condition of statehood for West Virginia and by mandating that free
Black men be enlisted in the armed forces.34  Although Black soldiers
were paid less, were segregated, had White commanders, and were
not initially intended for combat, the performance of the troops
helped break down some of the White prejudice in the North, preva-
lent at the time.35
During and after the Civil War, the radical Republicans, all aboli-
tionists and many in favor of equal rights for Black people, had signifi-
cant influence in the government.36  Thus, the focus of the movement
was on the structures of the law to accomplish emancipation.37  Those
who also desired racial equality hoped that it would follow from
emancipation or from additional laws designed to promote equality.38
The first legal mechanisms created to address the civil and social
inequality of Black people, and not simply emancipation, came at the
end of the Civil War and during Reconstruction.39  While there were
32. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA
495–96 (1988).
33. See id. at 557–59.
34. See id. at 562–65.  Black soldiers had fought in the Revolutionary War and the
War of 1812, and had also been enlisted in the Union Navy, but not the Union Army,
prior to this mandate. See id. at 563.
35. See id. at 565, 686–87.  The arming of free Blacks did not have the same effect
on southerners, who instead retaliated against Black soldiers who had been caught,
putting them at a higher risk of death than White soldiers. See id. at 566–67, 793–96.
36. See id. at 687–88, 805; MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE:
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 28–41, 45–46 (1986)
(describing the varying views of Republicans on equality for Blacks, but the essential
unity when it came to Blacks and civil liberties guaranteed in the Bill of Rights).
37. See MCPHERSON, supra note 32, at 699–709, 712–13.
38. See id. at 701–02, 707, 716. But see id. at 709 (describing Lincoln’s proclama-
tion of amnesty and reconstruction, which contemplated a more active type of depen-
dency and guardian arrangement).
39. Before this time, the role of the government was as an enforcer of inequality
through positive law.  Positive law in the states, for example, prohibited antislavery
speech, prohibited the education of Black people, restricted the power of manumis-
sion, prohibited Black people from testifying in court, and prohibited free Black peo-
ple from entering slave-holding and free western states. See THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES ii–iv (Alfred Avins ed., 1967); CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 2d
Sess. 418–19 (1849), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES,
supra, at 1–2; CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 123–24, 288–89, 482, 1654–64,
1674–78, 2066 (1850), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES,
supra, at 3–10; CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 234, 240, 1012–13, 1155, 1556
(1854), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra, at 11;
CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 124, 1598 (1856), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUC-
TION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra, at 12; CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 140
(1857), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra, at 12;
CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 402, 1965–67 (1858), reprinted in THE RECON-
STRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra, at 13; CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess.
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some legal advances during the Civil War,40 the most notable came
after with the Thirteenth,41 Fourteenth,42 and Fifteenth43 Amend-
ments to the Constitution.
The Thirteenth Amendment was adopted in 1865 and abolished
slavery.44  However, Republicans quickly realized that emancipation
would not be enough to give free Blacks even the most basic human
rights.  The southern legislatures passed Black Codes restricting free-
948, 951–53, 970, 974–75, 980, 982–87, 1006 (1859), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUC-
TION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra, at 14–19; CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess.
1677–87, 1839 (1860), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES,
supra, at 20–29; CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 83–84 (1861), reprinted in THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra, at 29.
Similarly, federal law provided lower pay for Black soldiers and prohibited them
from at least some federal employment. See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’
DEBATES, supra, at iv–v.  The Supreme Court upheld this positive law and added
another layer of legally enforced inequality. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 454
(1857) (holding that Black people were not citizens of the United States and therefore
not entitled to the protection of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in art. IV, § 2 of
the United States Constitution); Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. 6, 10 (1852) (upholding as
constitutional a provision in the Illinois Constitution prohibiting the immigration to
the state of free Black people).
40. For example, Massachusetts abolished racial segregation on streetcars and in
schools. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 39, at v; CONG.
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3133 (1864), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 39, at 79.  Additionally, Congress required the
military to enlist Black soldiers. See MCPHERSON, supra note 32, at 562–65.
41. The relevant portion of the Thirteenth Amendment provides: “Neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
42. The relevant portion of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of per-
sons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.  But when the right to vote
at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of
the United States, Representatives of Congress, the Executive and Judicial
officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to
any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be re-
duced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to
the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1–2.
43. The Fifteenth Amendment provides: “The right of citizens of the United States
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on ac-
count of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XV,
§ 1.
44. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
\\server05\productn\T\TWL\13-2\TWL209.txt unknown Seq: 10  2-AUG-07 13:31
524 TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13
dom of movement, the right to own property, freedom of contract,
freedom of assembly, and the right to bear arms, all by imposing spe-
cial penal laws applicable only to Blacks and by controlling Black la-
bor to the extent that the conditions of work were barely
distinguishable from enslavement.45  Republicans also hoped to avoid
a political revolution.  The Thirteenth Amendment annulled the
Three-Fifths Clause of the Constitution, so that the former slave
states, heavily Democrat, would nearly double their share of repre-
sentatives in the House.46  Black voters, who presumably would vote
Republican, could offset that.
Thus, to guarantee all of the rights of citizenship to Blacks, to be
absolutely clear that the Bill of Rights restricted the states, and to
ensure that representatives were apportioned based on those who
could vote, the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.47  Despite the
reference to voting in Section two, however, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not mandate by its language that Blacks be given the
franchise.48  Congress required southern states to permit Blacks to
vote on the same terms as Whites in the Reconstruction Act, and for a
short period, this led to a transformation in politics in some states and
heavy Black political participation.49  Northern states were not re-
quired to enfranchise Blacks, though, the Republicans—beginning to
lose power—pushed ahead to enact the Fifteenth Amendment,
prohibiting discrimination in the right to vote on the basis of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.50
The effect of these Amendments was quickly narrowed through
Supreme Court decisions,51 state legislation,52 and terrorism.53  Al-
45. See CURTIS, supra note 36, at 35; id. at 45–49 (describing the Republican belief
that the Thirteenth Amendment made the freed slaves citizens of the United States).
46. See id. at 45–49.
47. See id. at 26–130 (analyzing in detail the Republican view of history and politi-
cal theory, and critiquing legal historian arguments that the Fourteenth Amendment
did not incorporate the Bill of Rights).
48. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.  That section merely linked the number of
representatives to those able to vote rather than to the whole population. See ALEX-
ANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY
IN THE UNITED STATES 90–91 (2000).
49. See KEYSSAR, supra note 48, at 92–93; MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM
CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 10 (2004).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. XV; see KEYSSAR, supra note 48, at 93–94; KLARMAN,
supra note 49, at 10.  The right to vote for people of color has been supported by two
further key pieces of legislation: the Twenty-fourth Amendment, prohibiting poll
taxes; U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV; and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
110, 79 Stat. 437 (current version codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 through 1973bb-1
(2000)), amended by The Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King
Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006).
51. In the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 74 (1873), the Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment protected only the rights that owed their existence to the
federal government and not some broader definition of “privileges and immunities.”
See PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME
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though Congress initially fought encroachments of Black rights with
COURT AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH 66–68 (1999) (explaining how
Supreme Court decisions after the passage of the Reconstruction Amendments nar-
rowed the effect of those amendments).  The Court also held that the Thirteenth
Amendment was relevant only in cases of chattel slavery. VORENBERG, supra note
17, at 240.
Subsequent to the Slaughterhouse Cases, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1875, which prohibited racial discrimination in public accommodations.  18 Stat. 335.
The Supreme Court found that neither the Thirteenth nor Fourteenth amendments
gave Congress the power to enact this law.  Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11–12,
17–18, 22–23 (1883).  The Court found that Congress lacked the power under the
Thirteenth Amendment because it found that the Thirteenth Amendment granted
only the right to be free from the most literal forms of slavery. See id. at 22–23.
Congress had a wide view of its power under the Thirteenth Amendment to erase the
“badges and incidents” of slavery, and the Court’s narrower view created lasting im-
pediments to racial equality because slavery in the United States was based on a be-
lief that Black people were inferior:
Slavery as an economic system was of small account compared with slavery
as a system of racial adjustment and social control. . . .  Slavery was not the
source of the philosophy [of the biological inequality and the racial inferi-
ority of the Negro].  It merely enshrined it, prevented a practical demonstra-
tion of its falsity, and filled public offices and the councils of religious,
educational, and political institutions with men reared in its atmosphere. . . .
The defense of slavery was of a social system and a system of racial adjust-
ment, not of an economic institution.
MILTON R. KONVITZ, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 10 (1961) (quoting DWIGHT L.
DUMOND, ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL WAR IN THE U.S. 1 n.1, 52 (1939))
(alterations in original and footnotes omitted).
The Fourteenth Amendment was also viewed narrowly by the Court in the Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24–25, which held that Congress had the power under it to
restrain only state and not private actors.  Scholars have criticized the Slaughterhouse
Cases and the Civil Rights Cases as eviscerating the purpose of the Amendments. See
ERIC FONER, A SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 1863–1877, at 222–27 (1990);
VORENBERG, supra note 17, at 240–42; Christopher P. Banks, The Constitutional
Politics of Interpreting Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV.
425, 438–39 (2003).
The Fifteenth Amendment has never been applied outside of the voting rights con-
text.  Congress, however, had a rather broad view of its power within the voting rights
context.  It enacted a law almost immediately after passage of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment that, among other things, prohibited private parties from trying to interfere with
anyone’s exercise of the right to vote. See Force Act of 1870, § 4, 16 Stat. 141.  The
proponent of that provision argued that Congress had the power to enact any legisla-
tion that would protect against the States’ failure to prevent interference with the
right to vote. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3611–13 (1870) (comments and
amendment of Sen. Pool), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DE-
BATES, supra note 39, at 447–48.  In other words, Congress had the power and the
duty to enact positive protections to ensure that people could actually exercise the
right to vote.
52. For example, in the early 1870s, states reorganized districts and precincts,
closed polling places, and imposed financial and other requirements all to inhibit
Blacks from voting. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 422–23 (1988); KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 10–11.  Other
legislation, along with applications of government power, also limited Black rights.
See id.
53. See KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 10.  The primary enforcer of terrorism was the
Ku Klux Klan, which essentially was a paramilitary wing of the Democratic Party. See
FONER, supra note 52, at 424–35, 559–60.
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legislation that state and local officials could use to oppose those en-
croachments, by the mid-1870s, northern Republicans lost the political
will to continue to police the South, and federal efforts tapered off.54
In 1876, the presidential race was too close to declare a winner, and
the office was given to Republican Rutherford B. Hayes as part of a
compromise that ended Reconstruction and left southern Blacks at
the mercy of southern Whites.55
Few efforts were made until the mid-twentieth century to address
discrimination through law.56  Members of the Black rights movement
mostly turned inward.  In 1895, for example, Booker T. Washington
accepted the status quo and urged fellow Blacks instead to pursue ed-
ucation and economic advancement.57  There was a split in the move-
ment, even among the lawyers, between using the tools of the law to
attack discrimination, and relying on informal voluntary arrangements
to promote education, develop civic institutions, and develop eco-
nomic resources.58  “Race uplift,” autonomy, and cooperation became
the focus of much of the movement.59
The leaders of the Black rights movement in the early half of the
twentieth century did focus some efforts on the structures of the law
54. See FONER, supra note 52 at 454–57, 558, 586; KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 10.
Congress enacted several civil rights statutes: Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, §§ 1–10,
14 Stat. 27 (declaring that all persons born in the United States, except Native Ameri-
cans, are citizens and have the same rights as those enjoyed by white citizens); Force
Act of 1870, ch. 114, §§ 23, 16 Stat. 140 (enforcing the right of citizens of the United
States to vote in the several states); Ku Klux Act of 1871, ch. 99, §§ 2–19, 16 Stat. 433
(enforcing the right of all citizens to vote in the several states); Act of Apr. 20, 1871,
ch. 22, §§ 1–7, 17 Stat. 13 (providing the means to enforce the provisions of the
Fouteenth Amendment); Act of Mar. 1, 1875, Ch. 114, §§ 1–5, 18 Stat. 335 (granting
full and equal enjoyment of inns, public conveyances, theaters, etc. to all citizens,
regardless of race or color).
55. See Clarence Hooker, Compromise of 1877, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN-
AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS: FROM EMANCIPATION TO THE PRESENT 123 (Charles D.
Lowery & John F. Marszalek eds., 1992); C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND RE-
ACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION (1951).
56. The federal movement for racial equality was abandoned in 1877, and most of
the reconstruction legislation repealed in 1894. KONVITZ, supra note 51, at 66, 69.  In
addition, other than the Nineteenth Amendment, adopted in 1920, which provided
that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged . . . on account of sex,” U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1, further national efforts
to address social inequality were generally unsuccessful. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896).  There were some states, however, that passed civil rights legisla-
tion. See KONVITZ, supra note 51, at 130.
57. KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 3.
58. See Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the
Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256, 272–80 (2005); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE
NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–1950, at
21–33, 82–104 (1987).
59. See Mack, supra note 58, at 277–80.  Despite the inward-looking nature of the
uplift strategy, it was essentially assimilationist and could be viewed as simply a step
in a legalist strategy.  If Black people had the same socio-economic profile, and the
same kinds of civic institutions as White people, then they deserved the same rights as
White people. See id. at 282–83, 296–97.
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and on litigation in particular, but they saw it as simply one part of a
broad strategy aimed at public opinion and the structures of oppres-
sion.60  When the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) was formed in the early twentieth century,
it deployed legal advocacy and some litigation, and eventually created
a legal department.61  The strategic mission of the legal department
was to attack racial discrimination in education.62
The NAACP began its litigation campaign by attacking inequities in
higher education and won several victories.63  That campaign included
a national public awareness campaign in addition to the litigation.64
Additionally, other forces raised public awareness of the second class
status of Blacks in the United States.  Gunnar Myrdal, a sociologist,
published a comprehensive study of Black people in the United States
that became widely influential,65 and World War II itself highlighted
the injustice of racial apartheid in the United States when compared
to the policies of Nazi Germany.66  Cold War propaganda and White
backlash, too, put racism in the spotlight and made the federal govern-
ment committed to equality.67
Generally perceived as a great victory of litigation, the Supreme
Court decided Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, and declared
that racial segregation in schools violated the Equal Protection
Clause.68  After Brown helped set the stage,69 and when activists un-
60. See id. at 349–51.
61. See TUSHNET, supra note 58, at 1–2.  The NAACP’s legal program began as a
piecemeal project, and not as a coordinated strategy. See GILBERT JONAS, FREE-
DOM’S SWORD: THE NAACP AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST RACISM IN AMERICA,
1909–1969, at 34–41 (2005) (detailing the NAACP’s involvement in litigation up to
1934 when it established a legal department).
62. See JONAS, supra note 61, at 42.  Originally, the strategy also included attack-
ing discrimination in transportation, but Charles Hamilton Houston, the director, had
to limit the strategy due to the lack of financial resources. See id.
63. See id. at 43–45.  Those cases included Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590 (Md.
1936), and Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), among others.
64. See JONAS, supra note 61, at 45; KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 164–65 (noting
that Houston and Thurgood Marshall both understood the limitations of litigation in
creating social change and saw the need for organizing local communities).
65. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY (Transaction Publishers 1996).
66. See KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 176–77, 180.
67. See id. at 182–86.
68. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
69. Arguably, President Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights, formed in late 1946,
set the stage both for Brown and for subsequent legislation. See KONVITZ, supra note
51, at 70–72 (citing PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE
RIGHTS (1947)).  In its report, the Committee recommended “[t]he elimination of seg-
regation, based on race, color, creed, or national origin, from American life,” reason-
ing that:
The separate but equal doctrine has failed in three important respects.  First,
it is inconsistent with the fundamental equalitarianism of the American way
of life in that it marks groups with the brand of inferior status.  Secondly,
where it has been followed, the results have been separate and unequal facil-
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dertook massive efforts at civil disobedience to integrate public ac-
commodations,70 Congress began passing antidiscrimination
legislation again in 1957.71  It passed a second civil rights act in 196072
and finally enacted the most sweeping and widely used antidiscrimina-
tion legislation in 1964.73
A model legal strategy for civil rights movements evolved out of
this history.74  After an initial period of dawning group awareness and
local and national activism that resulted in an organized, coherent
movement, a group seeking greater civil rights would focus its ener-
gies at the federal level by seeking a declaration from the Supreme
Court that particular discriminatory practices violated the Constitu-
tion.75  If that top-down approach was not successful, the group would
seek a constitutional amendment and/or federal legislation outlawing
ities for minority peoples.  Finally, it has kept people apart despite incontro-
vertible evidence that an environment favorable to civil rights is fostered
whenever groups are permitted to live and work together.  There is no ade-
quate defense of segregation.
Id. at 72 (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE
RIGHTS, supra).
Additionally, President Eisenhower vowed to end segregation in the District of Co-
lumbia, and the Supreme Court considered segregation cases from the District before
cases involving the same issues in the states. See id. at 123.
70. See id. at 136–52; See generally CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN,
THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
(1985) (describing the interplay between the civil disobedience and the eventual pas-
sage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
71. See Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634.  The bill passed
after numerous compromises and after a one-person demonstration in the nature of a
filibuster by Senator Strom Thurmond, which lasted over twenty-four hours. See
KONVITZ, supra note 51, at 75.
Among other things, the Civil Rights Act of 1957 created a federal Commission on
Civil Rights, which was to investigate allegations of discrimination in voting and other
denials of equal protection, and which was to advise the federal government on equal
protection issues.  § 104, 71 Stat. at 635.  The Commission was to last only two years.
Id.  The act focused primarily on enforcement of voting rights. See id. at § 131,
637–38.  It was very modest, and disappointed liberals as too little and southerners as
too much. See KONVITZ, supra note 51, at 78.
The Commission issued its report in 1959, and found widespread discrimination in
voting, education, and housing. REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS (1959), http://www.law.umaryland.edu/Marshall/usccr/documents/
cr1195.pdf.  The report also noted the complex interrelationships of these kinds of
discrimination, and noted that Black Americans had become a sort of permanent “de-
moralized” underclass. See id. at 545–46, 548.
72. This act was another modest one, due in part to a filibuster and other delay
tactics that lasted eight weeks. See KONVITZ, supra note 51, at 84–89.
73. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of the Code).
74. Of course the history of the Black rights movement does not end there, but
continues, using the same general strategies of litigation, legislation, civil disobedi-
ence, and public education.
75. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (consid-
ering constitutional protection for disabled persons); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986) (seeking constitutional protection for gays and lesbians); Mass. Bd. of Ret.
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (concerning constitutional protection based on older
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the practices.76  If those efforts were unsuccessful or struck down by
the courts, the group would head to the states or more local bodies to
try the same tactics and more grassroots efforts there.77  After some
time and state or local successes, the group would again focus its ef-
forts on the federal government, beginning with the Supreme Court
and repeating the process.78
The women’s movement was the first to adopt the strategy used by
the Black rights movement.79  The women’s rights movement, to some
extent was born of the abolitionist movement, but began in a more
age); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (concerning litigation by the women’s
movement, seeking constitutional protection).
76. For example, women won the right to vote in 1920 with the Nineteenth
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend XIX.  The anti-age-discrimination movement won
passage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) in 1967.  29 U.S.C.
§§ 621–34 (2000).  And, the disability rights movement won passage of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990.  42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000).
The gay and lesbian civil rights movement, on the other hand, went straight to the
states and local communities after the defeat in Bowers and also focused on non-legal
institutions. See MARCUS, supra note 18.  Arguably, gays and lesbians have had much
greater success gaining acceptance in a shorter period of time. For example, the Su-
preme Court took only seventeen years to overrule Bowers, in Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003), whereas it took nearly sixty years to overrule Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), and almost one hundred to apply heightened scrutiny to women after
Bradwell.  Further development of this contrast must wait for a future project.
77. After unsuccessful efforts at federal legislation, the Black civil rights move-
ment focused its attention on the states and won passage of some civil rights laws. See
KONVITZ, supra note 51, at 130.  Similarly, after Bowers, the gay and lesbian civil
rights movement focused on gaining rights in state and local communities. See MAR-
CUS, supra note 18, at 406.
78. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (sexual orientation); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (gender); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (race).
79. Although the Reconstruction Amendments are viewed generally as instru-
ments of racial equality, the abolitionist and women’s rights movements were inter-
twined, and many members from both movements hoped that the Reconstruction
Amendments would advance women’s rights, as well. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong.,
3d Sess. 708–10 (1869), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES,
supra note 39, at 346 (amendment proposed by Senator Pomeroy to grant suffrage to
all citizens including women); FONER, supra note 51, at 115; NELL IRVIN PAINTER,
SOJOURNER TRUTH 220–33 (1996) (describing the overlap and the role Sojourner
Truth played in both movements); Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women’s
Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRI-
TIQUE 151, 162 (David Kairys ed., 1990). But see Franc¸oise Basch, Women’s Rights
and Suffrage in the United States, 1848–1920, in POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF WOMEN 289, 291 (Christine Faure´ ed., 2003) (detailing the way that
women were marginalized in the abolitionist movement).
One reason that the groups were intertwined was that women were active in the
abolitionist movement; women were allowed to engage in social movements, although
not to speak publicly, as a natural extension of the female “sphere,” even where they
were not allowed into most areas of public life. See Taub & Schneider, supra at 162.
Another reason for the connection could be that the mechanisms of oppression on the
basis of sex reinforced the mechanisms of racial oppression and vice versa.  In other
words, distinctions based on sex were well accepted and were used to justify distinc-
tions made on race and color. See KONVITZ, supra note 51, at 128.  A third reason is
likely the fact that many activists were also members of religious groups that empha-
sized equality of all persons. See FOGEL, supra note 19, at 204, 211; LYNN SHERR,
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separate and formal way with a convention in Seneca Falls, New York
in 1848.  At the convention, a “Declaration of Sentiments and Resolu-
tions” was presented, detailing the ways in which women were op-
pressed by men as a legal and practical matter and asserting that
women had natural rights equal to those of men.80  However, even
before then, activists had begun to lobby for reform of the laws gov-
erning married women, going door-to-door and collecting signatures
to petition state legislatures for change.81
The members of the women’s movement had been allied with the
abolitionist movement, but significant tension developed between
members of the two movements during Reconstruction when some
abolitionists advocated a push for rights for civil and political rights
for Black men, but not for women.82  The women’s movement will
always be tainted by the racist rhetoric that conflict produced and the
alliance formed by one branch of the women’s movement with a racist
Democrat involved in a political struggle over suffrage in Kansas.83
Out of this conflict, grew two separate women’s groups with different
strategies: the National Woman Suffrage Association focused on
achieving federal voting rights through a constitutional amendment
and also aimed at wholesale societal change; the American Woman
FAILURE IS IMPOSSIBLE: SUSAN B. ANTHONY IN HER OWN WORDS xix, 29 (1995);
Basch, supra, at 289–91.
80. Basch, supra note 79, at 292; The Seneca Falls Declaration (1848), http://
www.vlib.us/amdocs/texts/seneca.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).
81. See Basch, supra note 79, at 292–93.  These women faced significant hostility,
often from other women, but did succeed in changing some states’ property laws.
That, in turn, led to some changes in the laws governing child custody and legal iden-
tity. See id. at 293.
82. See SHERR, supra note 79, at 39–41 (reproducing a debate between Frederick
Douglass and Susan B. Anthony of the American Equal Rights Association in 1869);
Basch, supra note 79, at 294–95.  Black women in both movements were somewhat
torn because they were disempowered by both strategies. See PAINTER, supra note
79, at 221–33 (describing the positions and arguments of Sojourner Truth and Frances
Ellen Watkins Harper).
The debate and subsequent failure of the women’s movement at that time may have
helped solidify a theoretical division between protected classes.  This categorizing cre-
ates tension when a person is a member of more than one disempowered class.  Black
women may be treated differently from all men and differently from non-Black wo-
men. Thus, they may be subject to discrimination because they are Black women, and
not simply because they are Black, and not simply because they are women. Stereo-
types of Black women differ from those of Black men and from those of non-Black
women.  However, under our legal categories, this is often found not to be discrimina-
tion because they are not discriminated against because of their sex by itself, and they
are not discriminated against because of their race by itself. See PAINTER, supra note
79, at 224–25; see also RACE-ing Justice, En-gendering Power: Essays on Anita Hill,
Clarence Thomas and the Construction of Social Reality (Toni Morrison ed., 1992)
(describing the interplay between race and sex in the controversy surrounding Anita
Hill and the appointment of Clarence Thomas).
83. See PAINTER, supra note 79, at 228–32; Basch, supra note 79, at 294–95.
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Suffrage Association focused on suffrage, first for Black men and later
for all women, and advocated state-by-state campaigns.84
And so, nearly from the beginning, members of the women’s move-
ment used their organizational strategies to focus on the mechanisms
of the law to achieve change.  Similarly, the women’s movement was
relatively quick to turn to litigation, trying to have the courts declare
that women were entitled to equal rights, including equal voting rights
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.85
But, also from the start, the women’s movement was less cohesive
than the Black rights movement, and groups of women more often
focused on goals that would not, today, be naturally associated with
the advancement of women’s equality, like the prohibition of alcohol,
the abolition of child labor, reform of the penal system, consumer pro-
tection, and public health and safety.86  At the same time, women
were engaging in social work on a larger scale, as in Jane Addams’
Settlement Movement.87  This diffuse focus, particularly in the late
84. Basch, supra note 79, at 295.
85. See id. at 296 (recounting the constitutional argument put forth by Victoria
Woodhull and the prosecution of Susan B. Anthony for voting in 1872); see also
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (holding that states did not have to allow
women to practice law); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not require that women have a right to vote equal to that
of men).
Despite the tension described above, some members of both movements had ar-
gued that the Fourteenth Amendment should be drafted to grant equal rights for
women, as well as for Blacks.  In a setback to that hope, the Amendment was adopted
with the word “male” used in Section 2, which provided that representation in Con-
gress would be restricted for any state where the franchise was abridged for “any . . .
male inhabitants . . . , being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States,”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, and the Fifteenth Amendment failed to spec-
ify that the vote could not be denied on the basis of sex, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1.  See also FONER, supra note 51, at 115, 192–93.  This marked the first time that
gender was introduced into the Constitution. See H.R. REP. NO. 41–22 (1871) (re-
porting the majority view that the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit discrimi-
nation against women in exercising the right to vote, and the minority view that
disagreed on the ground that voting was a privilege and immunity of citizenship),
reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 39, at
466–71; S. REP. NO. 42-21 (1872) (reporting the unanimous view of the Senate that
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments did not give women the right to vote and
that denial of woman-suffrage did not result in an anti-republican form of govern-
ment), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS’ DEBATES, supra note 39, at
571–73.
Regardless of the language in section 2, members of the women’s movement argued
that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provided that all citizens get
equal protection of the laws, required that women have a right to vote whenever men
had that right. See Minor, 88 U.S. at 165; Basch, supra, at 296.  The Supreme Court
rejected that argument, reasoning that the right to vote was not an automatic privilege
of citizenship. See Minor, 88 U.S. at 170–78.
86. See Basch, supra note 79, at 298–99.  The women’s movement also allied with
causes that were more obviously related, like the socialist movement, the labor move-
ment, and the abolition of prostitution. See id. at 296, 298–300.
87. Id. at 299.
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nineteenth century, was fostered in part by the underlying premise
that women were morally superior to men.88
It was also fostered in part by the heterogeneity of women.  For
example, women workers of all colors saw little utility in the right to
vote, having achieved some successes by using the economic weapon
of the strike, and could not identify with some of the upper class
White women active in that movement.89  Again from the start, the
interplay of race, class, and sex have posed obstacles to solidarity
within the movement and to success for any but the most affluent
White women.
Notwithstanding these obstacles, at the turn of the century and the
beginning of the twentieth century, the various branches of the wo-
men’s movement achieved some successes, and some efforts to em-
power women as women were advanced.  For example, the
reproductive rights branch of the women’s movement was born in
Margaret Sanger’s efforts to promote sex education and birth con-
trol.90  Additionally, the suffrage branch of the movement gained
ground as well, and its activities increased in the early part of the
twentieth century, as the two suffrage associations merged and de-
cided to focus solely on suffrage at the state level.91  Just before World
War I, the group split again when the more radical Alice Paul formed
the National Women’s Party to lobby for a federal constitutional
amendment giving women the vote.92  The National Women’s Party
capitalized on the wartime propaganda to show that the rhetoric of
spreading democracy was hypocritical when women could not vote at
home, and this, combined with media coverage of the torture in prison
of members of the group who were arrested for protesting, led to the
adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.93
After adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment, the strategies of the
various strands of the women’s movement were very legalistic.  The
National Women’s Party focused its energies on lobbying for an equal
rights amendment.94  The labor branch of the women’s movement
continued to push for protective legislation and to defend the consti-
tutionality of that legislation.95 Another branch of the women’s move-
88. Id. at 298.
89. See id. at 300.
90. See id. at 298–99.
91. See id. at 301.
92. Id. at 302.
93. See id. at 302–03; U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.  A really fabulous film about this
part of the movement is IRON JAWED ANGELS (HBO Films 2004).
94. See MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED: POLITICS, WOMEN’S RIGHTS,
AND THE AMENDING PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION 44, 57 (1988).  At the same
time, another movement in which women played a large role, the anti-child labor
movement, also pursued legislation and a constitutional amendment to prohibit child
labor. See id. at 45–55.
95. See id. at 57.  In 1908, the Supreme Court had upheld protective labor legisla-
tion limiting the hours women could work on the not very feminist grounds that it
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ment focused on reform of laws governing sexual violence.96  And
finally, a fourth branch focused on reform or repeal of laws governing
contraception and abortion.97
The women’s movement has generally maintained this focus on the
structures of law, nearly exclusively, and, like the NAACP, women
formed an organization dedicated to lobbying and litigation: the Na-
tional Organization of Women, which had its own legal department,
the Women’s Rights Project.98  Efforts to ratify the Equal Rights
Amendment failed,99 but women achieved victories in national legisla-
protected the health of future generations. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
Shortly after the Nineteenth Amendment was adopted, the Court shifted gears a bit,
striking down a minimum wage law for women as inconsistent with women’s equal
freedom of contract. See Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).  The Na-
tional Women’s Party had filed an amicus brief in that case, arguing for the protection
principle to be discarded and the equality principle to be upheld. See BERRY, supra
note 94, at 57–58. That case paved the way for West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937), in which the Court overruled Adkins, and upheld minimum wage
legislation for both men and women.
96. See William E. Nelson, Criminality and Sexual Morality in New York, 1920-
1980, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 265, 301–11, 318–32 (1993) (detailing the women’s inter-
ests and laws relating to sex).
97. Beginning in the last half of the nineteenth century, abortion became widely
criminalized, in part because middle class married women were widely using the prac-
tice, and in part because of the efforts of male doctors to professionalize the medical
system and take control over women’s bodies. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOV-
ERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
170–75 (1985).  Similarly, in the last third of the nineteenth century, distributing con-
traception or information about it became a crime. See id. at 175–78.
Litigation played a role in the movement in the early twentieth century, primarily
as a defensive tool. Margaret Sanger, widely regarded as the mother of the birth con-
trol movement, was prosecuted for distributing contraception, and argued to the Su-
preme Court that the laws violated women’s rights to life and liberty by depriving
them of control over their bodies and their sexuality. See William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twenti-
eth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2118–20 (2002).  Beginning with Sanger’s case,
however, judges weakened the laws limiting distribution of sexual education materials
and of contraception provided by doctors. See id. at 2120–21.
98. See BERRY, supra note 94, at 61–62; Eskridge, supra note 97, at 2130.
99. The Amendment passed in Congress in 1972. BERRY, supra note 94, at 63.  It
included a time limit for ratification of March 22, 1979. Id. at 64.  Twenty-two state
legislatures ratified the Amendment that same year, but by November 1978, only 13
more states had ratified it, and four of the original 22 had purported to rescind ap-
proval. Id. at 65; see also id. at 71–73 (articulating questions about the constitutional
validity of an attempt to rescind a ratification).  In 1978, by a simple majority Con-
gress passed legislation to extend the time for ratification, which may or may not have
been valid as a constitutional matter. Id. at 70. Compare Grover Rees III, Throwing
Away the Key: The Unconstitutionality of the Equal Rights Amendment Extension, 58
TEX. L. REV. 875 (1980) (arguing that the extension was not constitutional) with Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment: A Question of Time, 57
TEX. L. REV. 919 (1979) (arguing that the extension was constitutional).  However,
even with the extension until June 30, 1982, no further states ratified it. See BERRY,
supra note 94, at 74–81.
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tion through the Equal Pay Act,100 the Civil Rights Act of 1964,101 and
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,102 and also in consti-
tutional protection through Supreme Court decisions.103  Women also
achieved some reforms at the state level through legislation and court
decisions.104
100. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206 (2000)).
101. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the United States Code).  Originally, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race.  However,
as a last-minute amendment by a southern Democrat, proposed as a means to defeat
the bill, sex was added to the list of prohibited classifications. See 110 CONG. REC.
H2577–84 (1964).  Even though the proponent thought that the inclusion of sex would
defeat the bill, Representative Martha Griffiths (D. Mich.) urged liberal groups to
support the amendment, reasoning that some conservatives would vote for it because
of its proponent, and she could persuade other members of Congress to join in. See
BERRY, supra note 94, at 61.
102. The less well-known name of this act is the Patsy Takemoto Mink Equal Op-
portunity in Education Act, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972) (codified at 20
U.S.C. §§ 1681–88 (2000)).
103. These constitutional protections include the liberty protections in the repro-
ductive rights cases, some examples of which, in the order that they were decided,
include: Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that the states
could not prohibit contraception for married couples); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972) (extending Griswold to all individuals); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(recognizing the right of women to control their bodies and choose abortion in the
first trimester of pregnancy); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (same).
These constitutional protections also include the equal protection cases, some ex-
amples of which include, in the order they were decided: Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971) (striking down a male preference in estate administration on grounds that it
was arbitrary); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (applying strict judicial
scrutiny under Reed to require that benefits for dependent spouses of female service
members be the same as for dependent spouses of male service members); Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (upholding a tax break for widows as appropriately reme-
dial even if not formally equal); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (discussing child
support termination for girls); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (requiring that
women be included in jury pools); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (adopting in-
termediate scrutiny for gender classifications).
One legal defeat during this period was Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), in
which the Court held that even though only women could be pregnant, because not all
women are, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not discrimination on the
basis of sex. See also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (applying
Geduldig to Title VII).  Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
in direct response to Gilbert, making explicit that under Title VII, discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy was discrimination on the basis of sex. See Pregnancy Discrim-
ination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(2000)).
104. See Leigh Bienen, Rape III—National Development in Rape Reform Legisla-
tion, 6 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 170, 185 (1980) (summarizing rape reform laws in the
seventies); Eskridge, supra note 97, at 2131 (detailing equality victories in state
courts); Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of
Women’s Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 2017 (2000) (reviewing family law reform); Lisa G. Lerman & Sharon
Goldzweig, Protection of Battered Women: A Survey of State Legislation, 6 WOMEN’S
RTS. L. REP. 271 (1980) (surveying legislation to protect battered women); Nicholas
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The paradigm strategy of moving from the top down was probably
chosen by women’s rights groups and others based on the apparent
victories of the Black rights movement and to maximize the effect of
group resources.105  There is only one federal government, while there
are 50 state governments, and thousands of smaller government bod-
ies.  So focusing on the federal government allows greater concentra-
tion of resources.  Additionally, when the highest court of any
jurisdiction declares that the jurisdiction’s constitution requires a cer-
tain action, that declaration provides the most absolute protection.
For example, if the United States Supreme Court finds that the Con-
stitution recognizes and protects a particular right, then no govern-
ment within the United States may restrict that right, and government
bodies will be empowered to prohibit private parties from restricting
the right as well.  Even if the right itself is not grounded in a constitu-
tion, a legislature may still have the power to recognize and protect
the right under a more general type of power.  And so even if the
group is more likely to get a good result at a more local level, for
maximum effect, it makes sense to focus resources first on the United
States Supreme Court, then Congress, then individual state supreme
courts, then individual state legislatures, and then more local govern-
ment bodies.106
IV. CURRENT STATUS OF BLACKS AND WOMEN
For some time, legal scholars have debated the utility of seeking
protection from the Supreme Court and the propriety of Court-cre-
ated protections in the Constitution for groups or actions.  Some of
that argument has focused on whether the Court causes social change
or simply reflects changes that have already happened.107  Some schol-
ars have suggested that the courts, particularly the Supreme Court,
have relatively little power to make change, and that real change can
H. Wolfinger, The Mixed Blessings of No-Fault Divorce, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM.
ADVOC. 407 (2005) (describing the reform of divorce law).
105. That was certainly one reason that the National Women’s Party focused on a
federal constitutional amendment after the AWSA and the later-formed National
American Woman Suffrage Association had so little success but expended so much
energy at the state level. See Basch, supra note 79, at 302–03.
106. See Eskridge, supra note 97, at 2156.  Eskridge also notes that federal victories
are more likely to “redistribute power toward women” in part because local govern-
ments are too afraid that redistribution will cause traditionally empowered groups to
leave the locality in protest. See id. at 2156 & n.485 (citing PAUL PETERSON, THE
PRICE OF FEDERALISM (1995)).
107. See JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 192–209
(1978); KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 5–7; LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING THE COURTS
TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE (David A. Schultz, ed., 1998); GERALD N. ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (contrast-
ing the dynamic court view with the constrained court view, and concluding that the
constrained court view is more accurate); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 333–55 (2002);
STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1970).
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only happen at the political or social level.108  There is not the same
kind of debate about using other types of law to create change, al-
though empirical work by social movement scholars has suggested
that extra-legal organization is more likely to promote substantive
equality.109  Therefore, there should be that debate.  Despite the num-
ber of legal victories by the Black rights movement and the women’s
movement, most scholars agree that neither group has achieved sub-
stantive equality.  Some statistics demonstrate the continuing dispari-
ties in income, poverty rates, employment, and education.
For example, Black households have a median income of about
$30,000, while White, non-Hispanic households have a median income
just above $49,000.110  Single female-headed households have a me-
dian income of just over $30,000, while single male-headed households
have a median income of just over $43,000.111  The median income of
individual Blacks is just over $16,000, while for non-Hispanic Whites,
it is nearly $27,500.112  For women, the median income is about
$31,500, while for men, it is just under $42,000.113
Poverty rates also present a picture of inequality.  In absolute num-
bers, twice as many White families as Black families live in poverty,
but proportionately, almost 25% of Black families live in poverty,
while just under 9% of White families live in poverty.114  Similarly, for
single female-headed households, more than 28% live in poverty,
while 13.5% of single male-headed households live in poverty.115
In terms of work force participation, about 60% of women are in
the labor force, while about 75% of men are in the labor force.116
Participation rates of Blacks and Whites are nearly identical to each
other, but the unemployment rate of Blacks is 9.5% compared to only
4.1% for Whites.117
Educational attainment shows a similar disparity.  In the White
population, 24.4% have a bachelor’s degree or higher,118 while in the
108. See ROSENBERG, supra note 107, at 338; KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 5–7.
109. See Kenneth T. Andrews, Creating Social Change: Lessons from the Civil
Rights Movement, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: IDENTITY, CULTURE, AND THE STATE 105,
105–17 (David S. Meyer et al. eds., 2002).
110. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU,  INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2004, at 4 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p60-
229.pdf.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 5.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 10.
115. Id.
116. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION: DECEMBER
2006, at Table A-1, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf.
117. Id. at A-2.  The White participation rate is 66.2%, and the Black participation
rate is 63.6%. Id.
118. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 1A: PERCENT OF  HIGH SCHOOL AND COL-
LEGE GRADUATES OF THE POPULATION 15 YEARS AND OVER, BY AGE, SEX, RACE,
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Black population, only 14.4% have that same level of attainment.119
More disturbing is the racial re-segregation that our schools have un-
dergone.  Most White students go to schools that are 80% White.120
Three-fourths of Black and Latino students attend predominantly mi-
nority schools, and more than one in six Black children attend schools
that are 99 % to 100% minority.121  Urban public schools are attended
primarily by Black and Latino students,122 and segregation of those
groups is closely linked to poverty.123
At the least, this smattering of statistics shows that disparities not
only persist, but that the status of some Black people is regressing,
despite all of the legal victories.  These trends suggest that the law, by
itself, is a poor effector of change.  The next section explains some of
the reasons that may be true.
V. THE PROCESS BY WHICH CULTURE BOTH CREATES NORMS AND
PROVIDES SELF-REINFORCEMENT
A number of different disciplines have contributed explanations of
why the law is not effective for radical social transformation.  For ex-
ample, chaos theory, or the theory of complex adaptive systems has
been suggested as a metaphor for the way that law and society behave,
and it suggests that laws will often produce unexpected results.124
Certainly, in at least a lay sense, law as a practice is a sufficiently com-
plex operation to make this comparison attractive.  We like to think
that the rules of the law are clear and uniformly applied, but the
method of law’s creation; the number of interpreters; and the process
of interpretation make that not only unlikely, but practically
impossible.
AND HISPANIC ORIGIN—WHITE ALONE AND BOTH SEXES (2004), http://
www.census.gov/population/socdemo/education/cps2004/tab01a-02.pdf.
119. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 1A: PERCENT OF  HIGH SCHOOL AND COL-
LEGE GRADUATES OF THE POPULATION 15 YEARS AND OVER, BY AGE, SEX, RACE,
AND HISPANIC ORIGIN—BLACK ALONE AND BOTH SEXES (2004), http://
www.census.gov/population/socdemo/education/cps2004/tab01a-04.pdf.
120. ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT HARVARD UNIV.,
A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE LOSING THE
DREAM? 4, 27 (2003), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/
reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf.
121. See id. at 28.
122. See id. at 53–56.
123. See id. at 35–36.
124. See, e.g., Thomas Earl Geu, The Tao of Jurisprudence: Chaos, Brain Science,
Synchronicity, and the Law, 61 TENN. L. REV. 933, 934 (1994); J.B. Ruhl, Complexity
Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call
for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849, 852,
854 (1996).  Some argue that the law is a complex adaptive system, while others say
that the science simply proves a useful metaphor.  I am not making a claim one way or
the other, and need not since the point in this article is not to predict how the law will
behave, but instead to describe why it behaves the way that it does.
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Philosophy has contributed to the discourse on the subject.  For ex-
ample, Michel Foucault wrote extensively about the way that knowl-
edge, or claims to truth, is organized by disciplines and institutions,
which shape the way that people think and which perpetuate them-
selves by doing so.125  Cognitive psychological research supports Fou-
cault’s description of the perpetuation of knowledge.  Our perception
is framed in fundamental ways by our beliefs.
The process is a natural one.  The things in our world are infinitely
varied, and if we had to process the impact of each variation we en-
countered, we would not be able to function.126  And so, we define
categories of things and then quickly sort what we encounter into
those categories without reflection.127  We use the definition of our
categories to explain what the thing we have encountered is and how
it is likely to act or be acted upon.128  This sorting function allows
quick judgments and makes our world seem more predictable.
Vital though the process is for our functioning, assigning a thing to a
category, essentially creating group identity, has far reaching conse-
quences.  When an object is a part of a group, we perceive it as more
like other objects within that group and less like objects outside of
that group than we would if that object was not part of a group.129
This process gets personalized when individuals are assigned group
identities.  Even when the distinction is arbitrary, like random team
assignment, the individuals see members of their own group (the in-
group) as more like themselves, and others (the outgroup) as more
different from themselves than they would without the group iden-
125. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE & THE DISCOURSE
ON LANGUAGE (Rupert Swyer trans., Pan 1982) (1972); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE
BIRTH OF THE CLINIC: AN ARCHEOLOGY OF MEDICAL PERCEPTION (A.M. Sheridan
Smith trans., Vintage Books 1994) (1973); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUN-
ISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995)
(1975); MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY
IN THE AGE OF REASON (Vintage Books 1988) (1965); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE OR-
DER OF THINGS: AN ARCHEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (Vintage Books 1994)
(1970).
126. See Eleanor Rosch, Human Categorization, in STUDIES IN CROSS-CULTURAL
PSYCHOLOGY 1, 1–2 (Neil Warren ed., 1977).
127. COGNITION AND CATEGORIZATION 27, 28 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara B.
Lloyd, eds., 1978).
128. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1161, 1188–89 (1995).
129. See id. at 1186 (describing two studies and citing Henri Tajfel & A.L. Wilkes,
Classification and Quantitative Judgement, 54 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 101, 104 (1963);
Henri Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice, 25 J. SOC. ISSUES 79, 83–86 (1969); and
Donald T. Campbell, Enhancement of Contrast as Composite Habit, 53 J. ABNORMAL
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 350, 355 (1956)).
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tity.130  People in a group are also much less able to see differences
among members of the outgroup.131
Groups or categories are created by the salience of characteristics.
Once a characteristic becomes salient (matters or makes a difference),
like gender or race, that characteristic defines a group.  But individu-
als define what is salient in any given context, often choosing what
their culture defines as salient.132
One consequence of these cognitive structures is the tendency to
stereotype, essentially a cognitive shortcut that links personal traits
with group membership in order to simplify the task of perceiving,
processing, and retaining information about people in memory.133
Once set, stereotypes “bias[ ] in predictable ways the perception, in-
terpretation, encoding, retention, and recall of information about
other people,” influencing judgment continuously.134  And just as for
salience, which defines groupness in the first place, we decide what
behaviors to attribute to particular groups.135
Stereotypes create expectations that transform the way individuals
perceive others, remember things about others, and attribute reasons
for the actions of others.136  For example, we determine whether a
particular person is suited for a job by comparing the stereotypes we
associate with that person to the stereotypes we associate with the
130. See Marilyn B. Brewer, In-Group Favoritism: The Subtle Side of Intergroup
Discrimination, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS
ETHICS 58, 61 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tennbrunsel eds., 1996); Anne Locksley
et al., Social Categorization and Discriminatory Behavior: Extinguishing the Minimal
Intergroup Discrimination Effect, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 773, 776–83
(1980); David A. Wilder, Perceiving Persons as a Group: Categorization and Inter-
group Relations, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING AND INTERGROUP BE-
HAVIOR 213, 217 (David L. Hamilton ed., 1981).
131. David L. Hamilton & Tina K. Trolier, Steroetypes and Stereotyping, in
PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 127, 131 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L.
Gaertner eds., 1986).
132. That is not to say that in every instance individuals make a conscious choice
about what characteristics matter.  Conscious adoption could happen, but individuals
also absorb that information from exposure to the culture they live in. See HOWARD
J. EHRLICH, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 35 (1973); Richard Nisbett et
al., Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition, 108 PSYCHOL.
REV. 291, 291–92 (2001).
133. See Krieger, supra note 128, at 1187–88; Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate
Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 321–22 (2000).  While
this description of what stereotypes are may sound very benign, stereotypes in society
with power imbalances such as ours has operate to perpetuate and even aggravate
those power imbalances.
134. Krieger, supra note 128, at 1188.
135. Again, this decision could be consciously adopted or learned through exposure
to culture. See David L. Hamilton, A Cognitive-Attributional Analysis of Stereotyping,
in 12 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 53, 64 (Leonard Berkowitz
ed., 1979).
136. See Krieger, supra note 128, at 1200–09.
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job.137  And it is very difficult for people to defy the stereotypes others
have of them.  We remember the things a person actually did only if
those actions fit our stereotypes of that person; we believe we remem-
ber a person doing things consistent with the stereotypes even if the
person never did them; and we forget the things that did not conform
to those stereotypes.138  Additionally, we attribute reasons for the ac-
tions of people according to our stereotyped expectations, so that we
assume a person who acts consistently with a stereotype acted because
of innate characteristics, but a person who acts inconsistently with a
stereotype acted because of transitional or situational factors.139
Thus, discrimination is accomplished at least in part through an
ongoing process of interaction that often happens outside of our nor-
mal self-awareness, which manifests in many small things over time,
and may culminate in larger actions.  Stereotypes are also self-perpet-
uating, yet they do not function entirely automatically and can be con-
fronted and changed by conscious effort.140  Therefore, even though
some discrimination may happen without full, contemporaneous self-
awareness, it is still an appropriate subject of regulation by the
government.141
137. See id. at 1200–04.  Krieger uses the example of a small woman with paralegal
training and a large man with physical education training both applying for a job as
police officer to illustrate this point.  If our stereotype of police officer includes a
physically imposing person, we are more likely to perceive the large man as a better
candidate.  On the other hand, if our stereotype of a police officer includes a person
able to defuse tense situations or apply the law correctly to particular conduct, we
would be more likely to perceive the smaller woman with legal training as the better
candidate. See id. at 1200–02.
138. See id. at 1207–10; Nancy Cantor & Walter Mischel, Traits as Prototypes: Ef-
fects on Recognition Memory, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 38, 41–45 (1977).
139. See Krieger, supra note 128, at 1204–07.  A good example of such attribution
bias is given by Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social
Science To Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the “Cluelessness” De-
fense, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 401, 433–34 (2003).  Because women with
children are presumed innately to put the children, rather than their jobs, as their first
priority, when such a woman is late to work, her boss is likely to assume that the
innate characteristic of priority of childcare responsibilities were the cause.  Because
men are assumed to put work first, a man late for work is assumed to have been
caught in traffic, a transitional cause.
140. See Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 244–47, 255–56 (2002); Ann C. McGinley,
¡Viva la Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 415, 430–32 (2000); JACK MEZIROW, TRANSFORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF
ADULT LEARNING (1991); Jack Mezirow, Transformation Theory of Adult Learning,
in IN DEFENSE OF THE LIFEWORLD: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ADULT LEARNING
39 (Michael R. Welton ed., 1995).
141. See Marc R. Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias at Work a Dangerous Condition on
Land?, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 459, 478–79 (2003) (analogizing liability
for discrimination caused by cognitive bias to the law related to dangerous conditions
on land); Michael Selmi, Response, Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bot-
tle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233–34 (1999). But see Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74
IND. L. J. 1129, 1130–33 (1999).
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However, that proves a problem for social movements.  The way to
substantive equality is, for at least some people, to agree to a redistri-
bution of social and economic goods.  But if belief systems are self-
perpetuating and operate to shape perception outside of a person’s
normal awareness, the task for social movements is to figure out how
to get people to realize what their belief systems are and that those
belief systems should be changed.
Even more of a problem is the difficulty of law itself. First, law is
usually a collective action.  A large number of people work together
to form the text that becomes the law.  Each person knows the mean-
ing of what he or she intends the law to mean, but those meanings can
differ.142  Divining what the end product means is not simply a search
for truth, but a process of creating a fictional unitary meaning from a
myriad of potential meanings.143  A person’s belief system will inform
that process of divination.  In fact, regardless of its source, the law
must be interpreted by those who enforce it.144  Each of those enforc-
ers operates under his or her own set of cognitive biases.  And so,
unless all of the actors have the same belief system, divergent inter-
pretations and applications of law are inevitable.  Moreover, the more
rigid and specific the law is, the less likely it will lead to uniform
results.145
142. The elusive nature of statutory interpretation and how courts should engage in
it has been debated by many. See Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big
Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 252–54
(1992) (describing the views of Judges Posner and Easterbrook in the Seventh Circuit,
and Justice Scalia, the three most prominent voices in the current statutory interpreta-
tion debate).  For more on the debate between Judge Posner, on the one hand, and
Judge Easterbrook and Justice Scalia on the other, compare United States v. Mar-
shall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1314–26 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J.) with id. at
1331–38 (Posner, J., dissenting); see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURIS-
PRUDENCE 275 (1990) (discussing whether an objective method of statutory interpre-
tation is possible); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23–29 (1997);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 536 (1983) (re-
jecting the notion that legislative bodies can have “intents”).  For an alternate view of
statutory interpretation, see e.g. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 38-47 (1994) (describing and criticizing overreliance on the text to
the exclusion of other interpretive tools).
143. I use “meaning” here in a very broad sense, not just to encompass what the
particular words mean, but also what effect on the world they should have.  And so,
for example, most people might agree on the meaning to the word, “discrimination,”
but there will be significantly more divergence about whether any particular act will
constitute discrimination.  In other words, people may agree that discrimination is
arbitrary, detrimental treatment of another, but may disagree whether arbitrary treat-
ment of someone who is usually privileged is really discrimination.
144. I use “enforce” in a broad sense to include judges, administrators, bureaucrats,
public officials, and even public employees: anyone who has some kind of power from
a government body.  The vast majority of government work goes unchallenged by the
average person, and so that gives even the lowest level employees significant control
to interpret for themselves the law that governs how they do their jobs.
145. John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty, 27
AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 47, 47 (2002).
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Therefore, unless all of the actors have the same belief system and
the same agenda as the group that sought the social change in the first
place, the cognitive process will bend the law from its intended conse-
quences.  The law is subservient to the dominant culture, and so even
when law is used to transform society, it usually gets transformed into
a reinforcement of traditional values instead, unless society is also be-
ing transformed from within.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF LAW
This critique of law means only that law has a specially cabined
place in any social movement.  The law serves some important social
values that, together with grassroots work, can make effective change.
The key is that the majority of resources usually need to be devoted at
the grassroots level.
Law is the appropriate tool to fix problems that the law alone has
caused.  For example, if the only relief that gay men and lesbians want
is access to military jobs, and the only thing keeping them from those
jobs is a law that prohibits their service, removing that law will accom-
plish that goal.  The kinds of problems that are caused by law alone,
though, are few.
The law also has an expressive function that communicates what we
as a society value and what we do not value.146  And so for the law to
penalize something tells each of us that the thing penalized is not
something we should value, and it may help to shape our belief sys-
tems in that way.147  The longer the law has existed, the more effective
this value may be.  The expression of a value through law may also
energize the grassroots movement or opponents of the movement.148
The law also plays a vital evolutionary function.  Each incremental
development in the law creates a new starting point from which to
move forward.  The cases striking down desegregation in one context
after another, culminating in Brown, demonstrate that process.  Addi-
tionally, one reason that women were able to eventually be protected
by the Equal Protection Clause was because the courts had developed
that area of analysis in the context of the Black rights movement first.
And, one reason that the Court was able to strike down same-sex sod-
omy laws149 was because it had developed a line of cases protecting
bodily integrity and sexual autonomy for women.
146. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Robert Cooter, Ex-
pressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); Robert C. Ellickson,
Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 (1998); Richard
H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1650
(2000); See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of the Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2021 (1996).
147. See KLARMAN, supra note 49, at 7.
148. See id.
149. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Finally, the law can also operate as a backstop against backlash or
ebbing of activism.  Once the law is there, it continues to operate—or
at least express its values—even if a counter-movement begins to pro-
test it, and even if the original social movement loses support for con-
tinued forward momentum.  At some point, these factors might create
a change in the law, but until they do, the law continues to have some
force.
And so, law has a role in social movements, but it lacks the power
to make the kind of immediate transformation that we often expect it
to.  For that reason, social movements should be very strategic about
how they allocate their resources to its pursuit.
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